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Abstract
Human interaction with automation is ubiquitous, occurring in many cyberphysical
systems such as cell phones, automobiles, and commercial aircraft. When interacting
with such systems, human users are only exposed to a simplified representation
the complex system structure in the form of an interface. The human can observe
system outputs and make control inputs via this interface. Problems with humanautomation interaction occur when the interface does not provide enough information
or provides misinformation about the underlying system, such that the human cannot
determine the current state of the automation. The user’s knowledge of the current
system state and prediction of the next system state is required for effective operation
of an automated system. In this work, formal methods are employed to analyze
user-interfaces of such cyberphysical systems in order to reveal state observability
problems. The cyberphysical systems are modeled as hybrid systems, for which
continuous behavior emerges from the laws of physics and discrete behavior results
from logical conditions and rules governing the automation. Hybrid systems with LTI

vi

continuous dynamics under collaborative control are considered, where collaborative
control indicates that some events and inputs are controlled by a human operator
while other events and inputs are controlled by the automation. The human user is
assumed to be a special type of state observer, with additional requirements beyond
a standard (automated) state observer. To reflect these additional requirements,
sufficient conditions for user-observability and user-predictability of linear hybrid
systems under collaborative control are developed. Algorithms are generated to
evaluate a user-interface based on these conditions for user-observability and userpredictability. Then, the algorithms are applied to a hybrid system model abstraction
of the longitudinal dynamics of an aircraft flight management system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Background

Before the word “computer” was ever used to describe a device, it was used to refer
to a person who completed long calculations. These people, or computers, were
employed during World War II to calculate the proper firing angle for artillery under
a variety of conditions. Three thousand firing angle calculations were compiled into
a single firing table, which would take a team of computers a month to finish [11]. In
an attempt to reduce this computing time, John Mauchly proposed a design for an
electronic computing device, and in 1945 Mauchly and J. Presper Eckert finished the
construction of an electronic computer they named Electronic Numerical Integrator
and Calculator (ENIAC). This computer took up an entire room and required 18,000
vacuum tubes [11].
Since then, a technological explosion has taken place, aided by the invention of
the transistor in 1947 and the invention of the integrated circuit (IC) ten years later
[8]. The constant improvement in size and performance of the transistor and IC has
made powerful handheld computers, like smartphones, possible. With this technol-
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ogy, computers can not only be used in place of human labor to complete tedious
calculations as in 1945, but they can now be used to complete much more complex
tasks that were once performed strictly by humans. Examples include autopilot
systems in aircraft, which perform many stabilization and navigation maneuvers in
place of a human user, and the Therac-25, a medical device which administers radiation therapy to cancer patients automatically [30]. Relieving humans of tasks such
as these and entrusting these tasks to devices with sufficient computing capabilities
is hereafter referred to as automation.
While automation has been implemented in a broad range of industries including
aviation, nuclear power, manufacturing, and medicine to relieve humans of tedious
tasks, automation has also been implemented to reduce the opportunity for human
error as a contributing cause of accidents. This approach to automation is especially
prevalent in the aviation industry, where accidents can be fatal. FAA investigations
have determined that over half of aircraft accidents are the result of human error
[18]. To reduce or perhaps, eliminate this statistic, many aircraft functions were
automated. However, aircraft accident rates have remained relatively constant since
the 1970’s despite increasingly automated aircraft. This suggests that automation
designers are missing some key information about aircraft accidents, and perhaps
accidents associated with automated systems overall.
This missing information may be found by noting that automation has not entirely replaced humans in the previously mentioned industries but rather aided humans. Thus, humans must interact with the automation frequently to accomplish a
joint goal. This human-automation interaction (HAI) would then appear to play a
large role in system functionality and take priority during the design process. But
it seems likely that many automation designers overlooked HAI, thereby designing
the automation as an independent system element rather than a system element
inextricably linked to the human operator.

2
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As a result of automation design without regard for HAI, automated systems are
often complex and seem to behave in a counterintuitive manner. The complexity of
modern automated systems often arises from the abundance of modes, or types of
system behavior. While only one mode may be active at a given time, the ability
of an automated system to execute many different behaviors via modes allows for
great flexibility because a single task may be accomplished in a number of different
ways [30]. But such flexibility can generate situations in which the user experiences
“non-determinism,” where different outcomes manifest after pushing the same button
under apparently identical circumstances [13], [26], [15]. that are perceived as nondeterminism by a human user. wealth of modes also creates the opportunity for
much confusion.
Non-determinism can make it impossible for the user to ascertain the current
mode of the system. Such occurrences are termed “mode confusion” in the literature [30]. Furthermore, automated systems often present the user with too much
information, such that all or most of the information becomes useless [5].
These examples of poor HAI threaten the productivity and functionality of automated systems as well as the welfare of the human stakeholders. Aircraft are
particularly sensitive to poor HAI because they are highly complex and dynamic
systems. Thus, aircraft are especially important in the study of HAI.
Furthermore, aircraft, like other automated systems, are sometimes referred to as
cyberphysical systems, which are physical processes controlled using computational
elements. Cyberphysical systems exhibit both continuous dynamics, which arise from
the laws of physics, and discrete dynamics, which result from digital logic. Due to
the high complexity of such systems, human users often interact with the system via
a simplified realization, called the interface. Since interfaces represent the underlying
system behavior, they must capture both the continuous and discrete dynamics of
cyberphysical systems. Therefore, cyberphysical system interfaces can be modeled
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mathematically as hybrid systems, which provide a rigorous framework to represent
systems with both continuous and discrete dynamics. In this work, interfaces for
cyberphysical systems are modeled as linear hybrid systems in order to analyze the
interfaces for HAI problems.

1.2

Motivation

As mentioned previously, incidents and accidents caused by HAI problems, especially
in aircraft, can be dangerous [30], [33]. A specific incident of interest is the 2009 Air
France Flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris [1]. On this A-330 aircraft, the Pitot
tubes measuring air pressure became obstructed by ice crystals and gave erroneous
readings. These air pressure measurements were also used to determine the aircraft
speed, which also became erroneous. The abnormally low speed reading due to
the faulty pressure measurement caused the autopilot and autothrust to disengage,
thereby abruptly relinquishing control of the aircraft to the human operators. Loss
of the autopilot and autothrust capabilities cause the aircraft control law to change
from “normal” to “alternate,” which entailed loss of flight envelope protections for
pitch and angle of attack.
A lack of sufficient communication between the automation and the flight crew
prevented the flight crew from quickly taking notice of the control law change. This
lack of communication continued as the crew struggled to diagnose the root cause of
the problem: the iced Pitot tubes and faulty pressure measurements. Without this
indication or an indication of the loss of flight envelope protections, the pilots sent
excessive pitch-up commands to the elevators. These continued pitch-up commands
caused the aircraft’s angle of attack to become too steep, eventually causing the
engines to stall and the aircraft to enter an unrecoverable dive [1].
This incident raises concerns about the information available to pilots during
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unusual flight conditions, such as erroneous speed readings. Considering the flight
displays and flight control panels as a user-interface through which the pilots can
interact with the automation, it is paramount that relevant information is properly
conveyed to the flight crew through such a user-interface. The purpose of this work
is to analyze the observability of the user-interface from the pilot’s perspective to
reveal design flaws and prevent later HAI-related accidents.

1.3

Related Work

The problem of human-automation interaction has been investigated by two general
groups of researchers: the human factors, or engineering psychology, research community and the formal methods research community. The human factors research
community is concerned with the design of devices and equipment that optimize the
productivity, comfort, and safety of the human(s) that must interact with these devices and equipment [18]. This research community has adopted the philosophy that
overall system function and performance will improve if “human-centered design”
principles are implemented, where human-centered design caters to human needs
and preferences. Justification for this design philosophy lies in the fact that humans ultimately bear the responsibility of safe and effective machine operation, so
the human operator should be the first priority in the design process [5]. Much of
the human factors research is based on historical data available in accident reports,
empirical data gathered by surveying human users about their experience with automated systems, or by observing human reactions to abnormal automation conditions
in a simulator [30], [33].
In reference to formal methods, we mean not only model checking and reachability analysis [7], [24], but also general mathematical techniques.The formal methods
research community is concerned with developing mathematical representations of
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various automated systems in order to analyze and evaluate them for certain properties. An aim of formal methods research is also to develop analysis techniques that
are applicable to many types of systems, regardless of context. An advantage of the
formal methods approach to researching HAI is that many different physical systems
can be represented by a single model with variable parameters. Once an acceptable
model is constructed, appropriate design principles can be quantified, and systems
can be evaluated based on those concrete principles. However, the formal methods
approach has the disadvantage of being unable to fully capture many real phenomena
since system models are not perfect representations.

1.3.1

Human Factors

The researchers in the human factors community were some of the first to identify
and study the problems associated with HAI. In particular, HAI in aircraft flightdeck automation became a major focus of human factors research because aircraft
are highly dynamic systems for which skilled operators are required, and aircraft
accidents can be quite serious [5]. Although aircraft accidents are few, occurring at
a rate of 2 to 3 accidents per million departures, and this rate has stayed relatively
constant since the 1970s, aircraft traffic has more than doubled since that time [3].
Such traffic growth increases the absolute number of accidents over a given time
period even though the accident rate remains constant. Since public perception of
air travel is based on absolute number of aircraft accidents, it is imperative that the
number of accidents be continually reduced in order to compete with the growing
number of departures [3].
Furthermore, over half of those aircraft accidents are believed to be caused by
human error [3], [33]. In an attempt to eliminate the opportunity for human error
in aircraft, many aircraft control functions were automated. But research has shown
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that the possibility for error has not been reduced overall, but changed [30]. According to researchers, these remaining errors are also non-random, occurring as a result
of traceable factors [22]. Human factors researchers believe that these factors stem
from breakdowns in HAI and can be corrected by employing human-centered design
principles.
Early human factors research that is still cited today established a basis for
human-centered design. Fitts’ list of tasks that “men are better at, machines are
better at” (MABA-MABA), suggest that humans lack the skill to assimilate a large
amount of information at one instant in time or perceive minuscule changes in data
sequences or graphs of data points [16]. This indicates that humans are poor monitors
of information that automated systems generate [33].
With the advanced flight management systems (FMS) of today’s aircraft, such as
the A-320, A-330, A-340, and the B-777, much of the flight control tasks are automated. As such, the aircraft operator is forced into a role of monitoring automation
performance rather than actively controlling the aircraft. This role of the human as
a monitor and supervisor opposes the suggested human role implied by Fitt’s list,
namely, an active controller.
However, Weiner and Curry have noted that it is not necessary to place the human
in a supervisory role where he is inherently disadvantaged [33]. In fact, monitoring
tasks and control tasks can be automated independently of one another [33], which
means that the automation can be tasked with monitoring and the human can be
tasked with active machine control without sacrificing system functionality. This
automation configuration would improve system performance because each system
component, namely, the human and the automation, is utilized according to its
strengths.
The level of automation associated with each type of task—monitoring or
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Figure 1.1: Graph describing independent control and monitoring tasks as well as
levels of automation for each task type [33].

controlling—also affects the human’s role in HAI. In particular, a high level of automation for control tasks produces the same result as that mentioned previously
[33]. The human is forced into a supervisory position where he is weakest. On the
other hand, if low-level control tasks, such as aircraft stability maintenance, were automated but high-level control tasks remained under the user’s command, the user’s
workload would be reduced and his ability to use his strengths would be preserved.
Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between type and level of automation in aircraft
according to Weiner and Curry [33].
Parasuraman et al. also explained that automation can be separated into types
and levels, but they developed a framework of four automation categories: information acquisition, information analysis, decision and action selection, and action
implementation [27]. Similarly, each type of automation can be automated independently of the other types. These authors propose that with this framework, the
appropriate level of automation can be determined for each automation type in a
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given application, thereby simplifying the automation designers job of creating a
high-performance automated system that also promotes effective HAI [27].
We acknowledge that categorizing automation into types and levels can inform
future design of flight-deck automation, but this method does not offer a solution to
the problems associated with flight-deck automation currently in operation. Since
the automation configuration which places the human in a supervisory position is
currently in use in most commercial aircraft, we aim to develop techniques which
will improve HAI for these systems.
First, we recognize that despite the human’s disadvantageous position, the human
must understand system behavior and know the state of the automation in order to be
an effective supervisor. This requires that the automation convey correct and relevant
information to the user [30]. The user receives information about the automation
through a device called the interface. Therefore, any information that the user needs
to reconstruct the system state must be available in the interface.
But an automation designer must determine which information is relevant. It is
also likely that the relevant information will change depending on a given situation
or mode of aircraft operation [20]. A test flight of the A-330 in Toulouse, France,
demonstrated that designing interfaces to present relevant information is not a trivial
problem. During the flight, the pilot tried a go-around (aborted landing) maneuver
with a simulated engine failure. An unexpected mode change and subsequent “decluttering” scheme on the interface occurred during the attempted go-around, causing the flight envelope protections to disengage without the pilots knowledge. The
decluttering scheme was a construct created to reduce the overwhelming amount of
information contained in the interface that required the pilot’s attention. But the
decluttering scheme hid information about the safe flight envelope boundaries from
the pilot, which ultimately led to a stall and fatal crash [29], [3]. The decluttering
scheme clearly contributed to the accident because of the lack of relevant information
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Figure 1.2: Simple negative feedback control system model, similar to that in [20].

it provided.
Other examples of the flight crew lacking enough information from the automation
are cited in [33] and describe incidents during which the automation fails gradually.
This automation tendency is not only dangerous because the failure is not indicated
explicitly to the crew, but also because the failure may cause nearly imperceptible
changes to the aircraft dynamics at first. Such situations may go unnoticed by the
crew until the aircraft is near the limits of safe operation [33].
Relevant information is also difficult to discern for complex systems. Modern
aviation automation has become complicated with the increased number of modes
and highly coupled nature of those modes. Many modes allow for great system
flexibility, such as the fact that one device can perform multiple tasks or the same
task can be accomplished in multiple ways [20], [5]. But additional flexibility of a
mode-rich system comes with great complexity.
Jamieson and Vicente note that a proliferation of modes creates greater opportunity for system failure and complicates diagnosis of a problem [20]. To properly
identify a problem and mitigate its effects on the system, analytical redundancy must
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Figure 1.3: Simple negative feedback control system model showing different controller and process modes.

be maintained [20]. Analytical redundancy is achieved when a model of each system
component is compared with a measured output signal from each component. A
system is deemed to be functioning properly if the predicted output of each system
component, according to the component model, closely resembles the measured output. But then the operator must have access to a model of each element in the system
and each signal between elements of the system, which greatly increases the amount
of information the operator must process [20]. A simple negative feedback control
loop diagram is given in Figure 1.2 to illustrate the system components (boxes) and
signals (arrows) for which the user must have information in order to identify problems effectively. To illustrate multiple controller and process modes, the controller
and process boxes have been segmented into different parts, as shown in Figure 1.3.
These segments demonstrate the ever increasing amount of information the pilot
needs to maintain analytical redundancy with the increasing number of modes.
Ultimately, the user must have access to the information that indicates the current
mode of operation of the aircraft. The complexity of systems adds to the difficulty of
understanding system behavior and knowing the modes that correspond to particular
behaviors. Tracking automation behavior and associating such behavior with the
appropriate mode is known as “mode awareness” [30], [20]. Disintegration of mode
awareness is known as “mode confusion” and can result in “mode error,” in which
the supervisor takes action appropriate for a one mode of the system but the action
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is inappropriate for the current mode [30], [20].
A lack of mode awareness can lead to serious accidents, especially in aircraft. This
mode confusion often stems from inconsistencies between the pilot’s interpretation
of how the system works and the actual system functionality. The user’s conceptual
model of the system is known as his “mental model,” which may not match the true
system structure [30]. An ideal user-interface would display the relevant portions of
the true system structure so that the system operation could not be misinterpreted
from the information given.
However, currently existing interfaces for automated aviation systems can still
be misleading. For this reason, Degani and Heymann used formal verification techniques to find discrepancies between a user’s mental model and the system interface
[13]. We also use mathematical techniques to evaluate a user-interface for relevant
information, namely, information that will allow the user to reconstruct the current
state of the system.
Mathematical techniques offer a huge advantage in the HAI research arena because they offer the ability to quantify vague problems and system requirements that
human factors researchers have referenced only through ambiguous narrative. One
mathematical approach taken in the investigation of HAI is user modeling [16], [23],
[19]. These researchers chose to model the response of a human in the control loop.
They found that the human exhibited an affect on the system like that of an integrator. These researchers, then, modeled the automated system as a series of concentric
control loops where the human acted as an integrator and analyzed the system for
instability.
Another mathematical approach which has become popular in recent years consists of formulating the problem of mode awareness as an observability problem.
In particular, some researchers have quantified the human factors indication of hu-
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mans’ limited memory in order to mathematically account for the human as a state
observer [26], [15]. But other techniques for automated observers of hybrid systems
also inform the problem of mode awareness in relation to HAI [9], [12], [10], [6],
[32]. We extend mathematical techniques from the research concerned with both the
human as an observer and hybrid system observability to evaluate user-interfaces for
relevant information.

1.3.2

Hybrid System Observability

Some researchers have discovered that mathematical techniques can be used to characterize the HAI problem of mode awareness as an observability problem. The formal
definition of state observability is the ability to determine the state of the system
from knowledge of the input and the corresponding output over some finite time
interval [2]. If the user of an automated system cannot determine the system state
or mode, problems arise. Observability analysis techniques can be used as a tool to
reveal such problems.
Furthermore, hybrid systems are studied in relation to HAI because of the continuous and discrete behavior of cyberphysical systems. But while standard observability for linear time-invariant (LTI) autonomous systems is well-known, hybrid
system observability is not well-defined. Different observability conditions for hybrid
systems can be developed depending on the type of problem being solved and the
assumptions being made. We now give a brief description of the relevant hybrid system observability problems and resulting observability conditions that exist in the
literature.
Collins and van Schuppen developed necessary and sufficient observability conditions for piecewise-affine hybrid systems (PAHS) [12]. They introduced the concept
of detectability, which asserts that a discrete event is detectable if it produces a
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measurable change in the output. A system is event detectable if all events are detectable. They also state that while linear systems are observable in infinitesimal
time, meaning the system is observable in some small time increment ϵ > 0, PAHS
can be observable in either infinitesimal, finite, or infinite time [12].
Investigation of observability for switched linear systems (SLS) was done by
Babaali and Pappas [10]. SLS are a class of hybrid systems in which the continuous state is governed by linear equations that switch according to the discrete state
of the system. These researchers provide initial state an mode observability characterizations for systems with both autonomous and non-autonomous continuous
dynamics and unobserved, arbitrary switching [10]. They assert that a mode is discernible from another mode if the continuous output of the first mode is different
from that of the second. They also found that discernibility is independent of the
time, or length, of observation. These researchers further claim that any discrete
mode of an SLS is observable if and only if every pair of different modes is mutually
discernible from one another [10]. They also develop conditions for observability of
the initial continuous state from the continuous output.
Balluchi et al. propose a synthesis method for a hybrid system observer composed
of two parts: a location observer and a continuous observer [6]. These researchers
propose such an observer for hybrid systems with linear continuous dynamics and a
discrete mode transition function that is not necessarily deterministic. They found
that for a certain set of conditions on the hybrid system, the location observer can
determine the discrete mode of the system after a finite number of time steps. Under
other conditions, the continuous observer generates an estimation of the continuous
state, where the estimation error is shown to converge exponentially to some maximum acceptable error value [6]. First, they consider the case in which the location, or
discrete mode, of the system may be determined after a finite number of steps from
only discrete information. Then, they consider the case in which the discrete inputs
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and outputs do not provide enough information to determine the discrete mode. For
this case, the continuous inputs and outputs must be used to determine the discrete
mode.
Vidal et al. extend the well-known Popov-Belevic-Hautus rank condition for
standard autonomous LTI system observability to SLS [32]. These researchers show
that the discrete mode can be distinguished from the continuous output observations
alone if those observations lie in the range space of the observability matrix for
that particular mode [32]. Once the current discrete mode is determined, familiar
observability analysis methods can be employed to determine the current continuous
state. This group of researchers also indicates that the switching times are observable
if and only if the difference between observability matrices for any pair of modes is
nonsingular [32].
Of these discussed hybrid system observability methods, none provides a solution
to the specific problem we are interested in. We seek to characterize linear hybrid
system observability where the continuous dynamics are non-autonomous, the input
is partially unknown, and the human is the observer. Collins and van Schuppen characterized the observability of discrete modes as event detectability, using information
about the discrete events and the continuous output. But this method fails to take
into account the fact that humans cannot easily perceive changes in the continuous
output, especially if these changes are quite small. Also, a measurable change for an
automated observer will be quite different from that for a human observer. Because
of humans’ difficulty in perceiving changes in the continuous output, we choose to
use only discrete information to reconstruct the discrete mode, when available. We
then use information from the continuous output if the discrete information is inadequate for the user to reconstruct the system state. Our observability conditions
further differ from event detectability in that a given output can only result from a
single mode. This is more restrictive than simply requiring that the output change
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in some way in order detect an event.
Babaali and Pappas develop conditions for discrete mode and continuous state
observability for SLS with both autonomous and non-autonomous dynamics, but they
do not use discrete output information in the reconstruction of the system state. This
assumes that either a discrete output map does not exist or that the observer has
no access to the discrete outputs. Since aircraft automation and controls have been
designed to provide feedback to the pilot in the form of light indicators, push buttons,
and aural chimes, which can be modeled as discrete outputs, we choose to include
the discrete output in the repository of information available to the user. Therefore,
the observability conditions we develop include information from the discrete output.
Balluchi et al. describe conditions required to design an observer, which is a
slightly different problem than the problem of system observability that we are interested in. Furthermore, these researchers do not require that the current state
be observable immediately. We require that the system state be observable from
current information because humans cannot remember long sequences of modes or
states. Humans need to be able to reconstruct the current state immediately in order
to properly control and/or monitor an automated system.
Vidal et al. provide useful conditions for observability of SLS with autonomous
dynamics. However, our problem includes an input, so we extend these conditions
to linear hybrid systems with non-autonomous dynamics.

1.3.3

Human As Observer

Other observability research has been done by assuming the human is a special
type of observer, who cannot reliably remember past observations, is limited in the
amount of information that he can process at once, and only has access to the current
human input but not higher derivatives of his input [14], [15]. These assumptions
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are formulated into mathematical restrictions on the information available to the
observer.
Such restrictions are motivated by Human Factors research into common HAI
problems, where humans have been known to struggle to recall past observations,
sometimes referred to as “mental bookkkeeping” [30]. Humans have also been known
to struggle with an overwhelming amount of information or burdensome information
processing while performing basic control tasks, as sometimes occurs during aircraft
operation [33], [5]. Other difficulties human aircraft operators often face is spatial
disorientation, sometimes associated with the umbrella term known as “situation
awareness” [14]. Spatial disorientation can occur, for instance, when an aircraft pilot
perceives a pitch-up attitude when the aircraft is, in fact, only undergoing linear
acceleration. If the pilot increases the thrust to cause a linear acceleration, but then
believes that the aircraft is ascending, his understanding of how his inputs affect the
system is inaccurate. This phenomenon suggests that human operators cannot make
use of the higher derivatives of their inputs to reconstruct the system state.
Oishi et al. used discrete event systems (DES) to analyze observability problems
with human-machine interfaces [26]. They formulated the concept of immediate
observability for deterministic DES in order to capture the importance of easily understandable interfaces in time and safety critical systems. Immediate observability
requires that the human user be able to uniquely determine the current state of the
DES from the current discrete output and either the next or last event [26]. The
conditions these researchers developed for immediate observability were then used to
analyze DES for likely observability issues. This group also extended the methods to
include design of DES which were immediately observable minimal representations
of the underlying system [26].
Eskandari and Oishi model human interaction with an automated system, like
an aircraft, as a continuous LTI system under shared control [15]. A system under
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shared control is one for which the automation may control certain inputs, the human
may control other inputs separately, and some inputs may be controlled by both the
human and the automation [15]. As often seems a reasonable assumption from the
information presented in aircraft manuals and accident reports, it is assumed that the
user does not have knowledge of the automation input. Furthermore, the human is
treated as a special type of state observer that cannot recall past outputs and cannot
utilize higher derivatives of his input to reconstruct the system state [14], [15]. This
assumption used to solve the state observability problem is manifest mathematically
as a partially unknown input observability problem.

Similar to [9], projection matrices were used to eliminate the unknown input.
But the successive multiplication of projection matrices was applied in order to
eliminate each term of the unknown input individually, including the automation
input, the combined control input, and the unknown derivatives of the human input. The resulting terms were then used to construct the user-observable subspace,
which results from the assumption about a human observer and is smaller than the
standard observable subspace. These researchers also defined a construct called the
user-predictable subspace in order to accommodate the human factors belief that automated system must behave in a predictable manner to ensure effective HAI. The
user-predictable subspace is a subset of the user-observable subspace.

The previously mentioned research into formal methods of representing the human as an observer relate to our problem because we also restrict our observability
conditions to account for a human as the state observer. However, the research presented does not apply to hybrid systems. We extend the immediate observability
conditions of [26] and the concepts of user-observable and user-predictable subspaces
of [15] to formulate user-observability and user-predictability of linear hybrid systems.
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1.4

Theoretical Contributions

The novel contribution of this work includes sufficient conditions for userobservability and user-predictability of discrete event systems, extended from the
concept of immediate observability developed in [26]. The conditions developed for
user-observability and user-predictability of discrete event systems is combined with
methods for determination of the continuous user-observable and user-predictable
subspaces for LTI continuous systems in [15] to generate sufficient conditions for userobservability and user-predictability of linear hybrid systems with partially unknown
input. I have developed two algorithms utilizing these conditions to determine if a
linear hybrid system is both user-observable and user-predictable or neither. The
first algorithm indicates whether or not the user can uniquely reconstruct the initial
hybrid state of the system. The second algorithm indicates whether or not the user
can uniquely reconstruct both the current hybrid state and next hybrid state of
the system. Furthermore, I have developed an algorithm describing construction of
the user-observable hybrid subspace as well as an algorithm denoting construction
of the user-predictable hybrid subspace. I then apply Algorithms 1 and 2 to the
2009 Air France Flight 447 scenario to demonstrate the appearance of problems with
user-interface observability in real systems. I plan to submit this work to the IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans with
co-author Dr. Meeko Oishi during the spring of 2014.

1.5

Outline

Chapter 1 of this work introduces the concept of HAI and describes research done to
investigate HAI problems from the Human Factors perspective. An overview of research on hybrid system observability is given. Research on mathematical techniques
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which characterize a human as an observer is also presented. The novel theoretical
contributions of this work are also stated in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 specifies userobservability and user-predictability of discrete event systems, extended from the
concept of immediate observability developed in [26]. Chapter 3 extends the familiar
Popov-Belevic-Hautus rank condition to mode distinguishability for linear hybrid
systems with partially unknown input. Also in Chapter 3 are algorithms detailing a
procedure to determine if a linear hybrid system is both user-observable and userpredictable or neither. Chapter 3 concludes with an aircraft example abstracted
from the Air France Flight 447 incident. Finally, Chapter 4 is devoted to concluding
remarks and directions for future work.
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Chapter 2

User-Observability and
User-Predictability of Discrete
Event Systems

Described briefly in Subsection 1.3.3, immediate observability of DES indicates that
the current discrete state can be uniquely reconstructed from current information
alone [26]. States that can be reconstructed from current information alone correspond to states that can be determined immediately. These immediately observable
states are highly important in dynamic systems such as aircraft, where even short
periods of operator confusion can lead to deadly accidents. In this chapter, the conditions for immediate observability are decomposed into to user-observability and
user-predictability of DES. This decomposition will allow for further extension of
user-observability and user-predictability to linear hybrid systems in Chapter 3.
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2.1

Problem Formulation

Consider a deterministic discrete event system G = (Q, Σ, φ), in which Q is a finite
set of states, Σ = Σo ∪ Σuo is a finite set of events, composed of the set of observable
events Σo and the set of unobservable events Σuo , and the state transition function
is represented by φ : Q × Σ → Q. We presume the set of initial states is Q0 ⊂ Q.
We also define an output map h : Q → Y , such that h(q) = y for y ∈ Y, q ∈ Q [26].
Define the following sets:
Qy := {q ∈ Q | ∃y ∈ Y, y = h(q)}
Qy′ := {q ′ ∈ Q | ∃y ′ ∈ Y, y ′ = h(q ′ ), q ′ = φ(q, σ)}
Iσf := {q ′ ∈ Q | ∀q ∈ Q, q ′ = φ(q, σ)}
Iσb := {q ∈ Q | ∀q ′ ∈ Q, q ′ = φ(q, σ)}
where Qy is the set of all states whose output is y ∈ Y , Iσf is the set of all states
forward reachable through an event σ ∈ Σ from any q ∈ Q, and Iσb is the set of all
states backwards reachable through an event σ ∈ Σ.
The set of events Σ can also be partitioned into those events that are controlled
by the automation (Σa ) and those events that are under human authority (Σh ). The
automation-controlled events may represent automatic transitions (e.g., when the
aircraft touches down, it automatically transitions into rollout mode to steer itself
along the runway). While it is most straightforward to presume that the humancontrolled events are observable (e.g., Σh = Σo ) and automatic transitions are unobservable (e.g., Σa = Σuo ) (as we do here in this paper), this assignment may be
problem dependent. For example, if a display annunciates an automatic transition
(for example, an audio indicator that indicates rollout mode is now in operation),
it may be more appropriate to assign that transition to the set of observable events
Σo . Or alternatively, consider a human-controlled event that is done so frequently
that it the user is unaware of doing it, or a distracted operator who pushes a button
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while thinking about something else, and is unaware of the event they just triggered.
In these cases, the human-controlled event may actually be best represented as an
unobservable event in Σuo .

2.2

Methodology: User-Interface Analysis

For a user-interface to have correct and complete content, the interface must allow
the user to uniquely reconstruct the current state of the system and predict the next
state. We formulate sufficient conditions for these two concepts: user-observability
and user-predictability for discrete event systems by extending the methods in [26]
for immediate observability. As opposed to standard definitions of observability and
predictability, only current information about the input and output may be taken into
consideration when the observer is the user (as opposed to an automated observer).

2.2.1

User-Observability

Definition 1 The deterministic DES G = (Q, Σ, φ) with initial set of states Q0 and
an output map y = h(q) is user-observable if the current state can be determined
uniquely from the current output and the last event.

Proposition 1 The DES G = (Q, Σ, φ) with set of initial states Q0 and output
map y = h(q) for all q ∈ Q is user-observable if and only if for any state q ∈ Q,
|Qy ∩ Iσf | ≤ 1, and for any initial state q0 ∈ Q0 , y0 = h(q0 ), h−1 (y0 ) exists.
Proof 1 (If ) Assume |Qy ∩ Iσf | ≤ 1. Then, at most, a single state is associated
with every combination of the current output y and last event σ. Hence Definition
1 is satisfied. (Only if ) Assume G is user-observable. The user can determine the
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current state from the current output and last event because both the output map h
and the transition function φ are deterministic.

2.2.2

User-Predictability

Definition 2 The deterministic DES G = (Q, Σ, φ) with initial set of states Q0
and an output map y = h(q) is user-predictable if the next state can be determined
uniquely from 1) knowledge of the next output and the next event (if the next output
is available), or 2) knowledge of the current output and next event (if the next output
is not available and the current state is known), or 3) knowledge of the set of states
with the current output and the set of backward reachable states through the next
event (if the next output is not available and the current mode is not known exactly).
Proposition 2 The DES G = (Q, Σ, φ) with initial set of states Q0 and output map
y ′ = h(q ′ ) for all q ′ ∈ Q is user-predictable if and only if for any state q ′ ∈ Q,
|Qy′ ∩ Iσb ′ | ≤ 1, and for any initial state q0 ∈ Q0 , y0 = h(q0 ), h−1 (y0 ) exists.
Proof 2 (If ) Assume |Qy′ ∩ Iσb ′ | ≤ 1. Then, at most, a single state is associated
with every combination of next output y ′ and next event σ ′ . Hence Definition 1 is
satisfied. (Only if ) Assume G is user-predictable. The user can determine the next
state from the next output and next event because both the output map h and the
transition function φ are deterministic.
Remark: In the specific case where the next output is known, user-predictability
is independent of user-observability.
Proposition 3 The DES G = (Q, Σ, φ) with initial set of states Q0 and output map
y = h(q) for all q ∈ Q is user-predictable if and only if G is also user-observable,
and for any initial state q0 ∈ Q0 , y0 = h(q0 ), h−1 (y0 ) exists.
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Proof 3 (If ) Assume G is user-observable. Then, the current state is known, so
the next state can be determined exactly. Hence, Definition 2 is satisfied. (Only if )
Assume G is user-predictable. The user can determine the next state from the next
output and next event because both the transition function φ and the output map h
are deterministic.

If G is not user-observable, the set of states in Qy ∩ Iσf can be used to determine
q′.

Proposition 4 The DES G = (Q, Σ, φ) with initial set of states Q0 and output map
y = h(q) for all q ∈ Q is user-predictable if and only if for any state q ′ ∈ Qy ∩ Iσf ,
|Qy′ ∩ Iσb ′ | ≤ 1, and for any initial state q0 ∈ Q0 , y0 = h(q0 ), h−1 (y0 ) exists.

Proof 4 (If ) Assume |Qy′ ∩ Iσb ′ | ≤ 1. Then, at most, a single state is associated
with every combination of the next output and next event σ ′ . Hence Definition 2 is
satisfied. (Only if ) Assume G is user-predictable. The user can determine the next
state from the next output and next event because both the output map h and the
transition function φ are deterministic.

2.2.3

Immediate Observability

The following proposition from [26] is shown to illuminate the relationship among
user-observability, user-predictability, and immediate observability.
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Proposition 5 The system G = (Q, Σ, φ) with initial set of states Q0 is immediately
observable if and only if the following conditions hold (∀σ, σ ′ ∈ Σ, ∀y ∈ Y ):
1. (For initial state: y0 = h(q0 )) for all q0 ∈ Q0
(a) h−1 (y0 ) exists (Qy0 available)
(b) |Qy0 ∩ Iσb ′ | ≤ 1 (Qy0 and the next event available)
2. (For any state: y = h(q)) for all q ∈ Q and for k ∈ N +
(a) h(q(k − 1)) ̸= h(q(k)) if q(k) ∈ φ(q(k − 1), σ ∈ Σuo ) , and
(b) |Qy ∩ Iσf | ≤ 1 (Qy and the last event available), or
(c) |Qy ∩ Iσb ′ | ≤ 1 (Qy and the next event available), or
(d) |Iσf ∩ Qy ∩ Iσb ′ | ≤ 1 (Qy , the last, and next events available).
Note that conditions 2(b) and 2(c) are not synonymous with 2(d) unless Iσf = Iσb .
Proposition 6 A DES G = (Q, Σ, φ) is immediately observable if it is either userobservable or user-predictable.

Proof 5 For a DES G that is user-observable, conditions 2(b) and 2(d) of Proposition 5 hold, indicating that the system is immediately observable. For a DES G
that is user-predictable, conditions 2(c) and 2(d) of Proposition 5 hold; hence G is
immediately observable.
Example: Consider a deterministic DES G = (Q, Σ, φ) with Q = {1, 2, 3, 4}, Σ =
{a, b}, Q0 = {1, 4}, and the state transition function φ defined as in Figure 2.1.
We define the output Y = {A, B}, and the output map h is defined by h(1) =
h(4) = B and h(2) = h(3) = A. The forward reachable states through event a
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Figure 2.1: Illustrative example of a system which is immediately observable but not
user-observable.

are Iaf = {1, 4}. The forward reachable states through event b are Ibf = {2, 3}. If
any of these forward reachable states cannot be determined uniquely, the system is
not user-observable because the condition described in Proposition 1 does not hold
for any output y ∈ Y and last event σ. For instance, applying the condition in
Proposition 1 for output y = B and last event a yields |QB ∩ Iaf | = |{1, 4}| = 2, so
G is not user-observable. However, every combination of output and next event in
this system is associated with, at most, one state. The backward reachable states
through event a are Iab = {1, 2}, and the backward reachable states through event b
are also {1, 2}. Applying condition 2(b) of Proposition 5 for both output y = A and
y = B yields |QA ∩ Iab | = |{2}| = 1, |QA ∩ Ibb | = |{2}| = 1, |QB ∩ Iab | = |{1}| = 1,
|QB ∩ Ibb | = |{1}| = 1. Thus, the DES is user-predictable, and hence immediately
observable, but not user-observable.
Remark: For a continuous system, user-predictability implies user-observability
[15]. However, for a discrete event system, user-predictability does not imply userobservability.

2.3

Summary

The definitions of user-observability and user-predictability for DES presented in
this chapter can be combined with the conditions for user-observability and user-
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predictability of continuous LTI systems from [15] to generate conditions for linear
hybrid systems. These conditions are developed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
User-Observability and
User-Predictability of Hybrid
Systems
Sufficient conditions for user-observability and user-predictability of linear hybrid
systems with partially unknown input are generated in this chapter. First, we
present the formal framework used to solve the problem of state observability for
linear hybrid systems. Then, mode distinguishability for linear hybrid systems with
partially unknown input is developed. The algorithms incorporating conditions for
user-observability and user-predictability are presented, and these algorithms are
applied to real aircraft examples.

3.1

Problem Formulation

Consider an abstraction of the longitudinal dynamics of an aircraft flight management
system as a hybrid system model represented by the tuple H = (Q, X, Σ, R, φ, fq ),
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with discrete modes q ∈ Q, continuous state x ∈ X, discrete events σ ∈ Σ, continuous
reference inputs r ∈ R, discrete transition function φ : Q×X ×Σ×R → Q, for which
we assume an identity reset map, and the continuous dynamics fq : X × R → X
indexed by mode q ∈ Q, where fq = Aq x+Bq u+Bq,λ λ, u is the primary human user’s
input, λ is the combined unknown automation input and input from other human
users, and u = −Kx + N r. We further define the hybrid output map h : Q × X →
Yq × Yx = Ψ, where the output Ψ is composed of both discrete and continuous
elements, such as is shown using the notation Ψ = (hq (q), hx (q, x)) = (yq , yx ) where
yx = Cq x + Dq u.
Multiple representations of discrete events Σ for a hybrid system can be adopted.
One description fitting of a problem concerning aircraft controls could consist of a set
of discrete events that are initiated by the pilot Σh1 , a set of events initiated by the
copilot Σh2 , and a set of events initiated by the automation Σauto . The mathematical
description of this representation is given by Σ = Σh1 ∪ Σh2 ∪ Σauto .
However, we use an equivalent, but alternative, representation which highlights
the known and unknown information from the perspective of a single user, such as
the pilot. We choose to group the discrete events into those annunciated to the the
pilot, and those not annunciated to the pilot. We write this as Σ = Σannun
∪ Σnon
1
1 .
Oftentimes, the events initiated by the automation and those initiated by human
users other than the pilot will map to the set of events not annunciated to the pilot
Σnon
1 . But this mapping will depend upon a given system structure.
The usefulness of this discrete event representation can be illustrated with a brief
example. Consider the event σAP , which is used to represent the push-button input
to engage the autopilot. First, assume that this event σAP is only annunciated to
the user that initiates it. Also assume that the pilot initiates σAP . As such, σAP
, utilizing the representation which corresponds to the pilot’s point
resides in Σannun
1
of view. Similarly, if we use the representation which corresponds to the copilot’s
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perspective, σAP lies in Σnon
2 .

3.2

Methodology: User-Interface Analysis

The observability techniques for DES described in Section 2.2 and the observability
techniques for continuous LTI systems under collaborative control described in [15]
can be combined to generate observability techniques for linear hybrid systems under
collaborative control. An algorithm is developed which indicates whether or not the
current hybrid state and the instantaneous next hybrid state can be determined
uniquely given the system model H, limited information about the output Ψ, the
discrete inputs σ ∈ Σ, and the continuous inputs r ∈ R. The ability of human
operators of automated systems to reconstruct the current hybrid state and next
hybrid state from currently available information constitutes effective HAI.
The algorithm takes advantage of the simplest information available to the user
first, which is comprised of the discrete information. This approach is similar to
that of Balluchi et al., where a location observer is first employed to determine the
mode of a hybrid system and then a continuous observer is used to determine the
continuous state [6]. However, the class of systems considered here—linear hybrid
systems under collaborative control—have non-autonomous continuous dynamics, so
standard continuous state observability cannot be utilized even once the discrete
mode is known.
Furthermore, the class of systems under consideration in this work not only have
the input present, but some inputs are controlled by the human user while other
inputs are controlled by the automation, which we refer to as collaborative control.
Also, observability restrictions arise from the fact that the human is considered to be
the observer, rather than the automation. For instance, the human has knowledge
of his continuous input but not higher derivatives of his continuous input, which we
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formalize as partially unknown input. The human operator also cannot be expected
to remember past events. Finally, automation inputs as well as inputs generated by
other human users may be unannunciated to the primary human user.
The Human Factors community claims that “good” human-centered design of
automated systems allows the human user to determine the current state of the
automation and be able to predict the behavior of the automation [33], [5]. We formulate these concepts mathematically as user-observability and user-predictability,
respectively.
Even with these restrictions placed on the information available for state reconstruction, the current and next mode may be determined from the discrete information alone. If this case manifests for a given system, then the continuous state can
be determined using partially unknown input observability methods for LTI continuous systems described in [15]. If, however, the current and next modes cannot be
determined uniquely from the discrete information, the continuous output must be
used to distinguish the modes.
The following text enumerates a novel method of mode distinguishability via
continuous output information for linear hybrid systems with partially unknown
input. For convenience of notation, the input vector and the output vector are defined
[
]T
[
]T
as U = u u̇ ü . . . u(n−1) and Y = yx ẏx ÿx . . . yx(n−1) , respectively.
It is useful to note that the output vector of an autonomous LTI system can be
expressed as the following.

Y = Ox

(3.1)

As discussed in [2], a unique solution, or trajectory, x exists for (3.1) if Y lies
in the range space of O. In other words, trajectory x can be distinguished uniquely
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from the information contained in the output if the following condition holds.

rank(O) = rank([O Y])

(3.2)

Vidal et al. extend the well-known condition (3.2) to autonomous switched linear
systems, where mode q ∈ Q can be determined from observation of the continuous
output if the following condition holds [32].

rank(Oq ) = rank([Oq Y]) ∧ rank(Oq′ ) ̸= rank([Oq′ Y])

(3.3)

Note that (3.3) must be evaluated for each possible mode pair in order to ensure that
each discrete mode in the hybrid system can be determined uniquely via observation
of the continuous output.
We extend this condition to non-autonomous linear hybrid systems. But first, we
define the Hankel matrix in (3.4) to make further statements about the information
contained in the continuous output.
The Hankel matrix is a square, lower triangular matrix.
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(3.4)

Aq , Bq , Cq , Dq define the LTI continuous dynamics of a particular mode within the
hybrid system [10]. The Hankel matrix also makes for a convenient way to express
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the output vector for non-autonomous continuous dynamics of a linear hybrid system
where the input and higher derivatives of the input are known, as shown in (3.5).

Y = Oq x + Γ q U

(3.5)

Then, (3.3) becomes the following for non-autonomous linear hybrid systems.

rank(Oq ) = rank([Oq (Y − Γq U)]) ∧ rank(Oq′ ) ̸= rank([Oq′ (Y − Γq′ U)]) (3.6)

We further extend (3.6) to linear non-autonomous hybrid systems with partially
unknown input to reflect the special requirements of the human as an observer.
However, we first rewrite (3.5) to include the partially unknown human input as
well as terms to represent the automation input and the input of other human users.
This formulation reflects the structure of an automated system under collaborative
control.

Y = Ox + Γq,1 u + Γq,2 û + Γq,3 λ

(3.7)

Equation (3.7) shows a decomposition of the input into known and unknown components, where û is a vector consisting of the time derivatives of the primary human
[
]T
user’s input u̇ ü . . . u(n−1) , and λ constitutes the combined effect of inputs
contributed by the automation and other users. Note that u is known, while û and
λ are unknown.
Similar to the methods used in [9] and [15], consider the projection matrix Pq,1
T
= 0, so that
such that Pq,1 Γq,3 = 0. This equation can also be expressed as ΓTq,3 Pq,1
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Pq,1 is in the left null space of Γq,3 . In other words, Pq,1 = (N (ΓTq,3 ))T , where N (·)
denotes the null space. Multiplying (3.7) by the projection matrix Pq,1 yields the
following.

Pq,1 Y = Pq,1 Oq x + Pq,1 Γq,1 u + Pq,1 Γq,2 û

(3.8)

A projection matrix Pq,2 can be used in the same way to set the unknown higher
derivatives of the primary user’s inputs to zero: Pq,2 Γq,2 = 0. We now multiply (3.8)
by the projection matrix Pq,2 .

Pq,2 Pq,1 Y = Pq,2 Pq,1 Oq x + Pq,2 Pq,1 Γq,1 u

(3.9)

Now that the unknowns have been eliminated, the rank condition (3.6) can be
further extended according to the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Any mode q ∈ Q is distinguishable from any mode q ′ ∈ Q via information from the continuous output yx if rank(Pq,2 Pq,1 Oq ) = rank([Pq,2 Pq,1 Oq
Pq,2 Pq,1 (Y −Γq,1 u)]) ∧rank(Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 Oq′ ) ̸= rank([Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 Oq′ Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 (Y −Γq′ ,1 u)]).

Proposition 7 is used to construct Algorithms 1 and 2, which indicate whether or
not a hybrid system H is both user-observable and user-predictable.
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Algorithm 1 User-Observability and User-Predictability of
Initial Hybrid State (q0 , x0 )
Require: Observations ψ ∈ Ψ are available, and sets Qyq,0 and Iσb ′ are known.
Ensure: The initial hybrid state (q0 , x0 ) is distinguishable.
1: for q0 ∈ Q, yq,0 = hq (q0 ) do
2:

b
if h−1
q (yq,0 ) exists ∧ |Qyq,0 ∩ Iσ ′ | ≤ 1 then

if rank(O(q0 )) = n then

3:

return “Yes”

4:

else

5:

return “No”

6:

end if

7:
8:

else if rank(O(q0 )) = rank([O(q0 ) Y]) ∧ rank(O(q ′ )) ̸= rank([O(q ′ ) Y])
then

9:

if rank(O(q0 )) = n then
return “Yes”

10:
11:

else
return “No”

12:
13:
14:
15:
16:

end if
else
return “No”
end if

17: end for
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Algorithm 2 User-Observability of Current Hybrid State (q, x) and
User-Predictability of Next Hybrid State (q ′ , x+ )
Require: Observations ψ ∈ Ψ are available, and sets Qy , Qy′ , Iσf , and Iσb ′ are known.
Ensure: The current hybrid state (q, x) is distinguishable.
1: for q, q ′ ∈ Q do
2:

for σ ∈ Σnon , q ′ = φ(q, σ) do
if (hq (q), hx (q, x)) ̸= (hq (q ′ ), hx (q ′ , x+ )) ∧ |Qy ∩ Iσf | ≤ 1 ∧ |Qy′ ∩ Iσb ′ | ≤ 1

3:

then
if OH,x = Rn ∧ PH,x = Rn then

4:

return “Yes”

5:

else

6:

return “No”

7:

end if

8:
9:

else if rank(Pq,2 Pq,1 Oq ) = rank([Pq,2 Pq,1 Oq

Pq,2 Pq,1 (Y − Γq,1 u)]) ∧

rank(Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 Oq′ ) ̸= rank([Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 Oq′ Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 (Y − Γq′ ,1 u)]) then
if OH,x = Rn ∧ PH,x = Rn then

10:

return “Yes”

11:

else

12:

return “No”

13:

end if

14:
15:

else
return “No”

16:
17:
18:

end if
end for

19: end for
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The terms OH,x and PH,x in Algorithm 2 represent the continuous user-observable
and user-predictable subspaces, respectively. The continuous dynamics contribute
enough information for the hybrid system to be user-observable and user-predictable
only if each subspace covers the entire state space [15].
Also, note that the hybrid system H is only user-observable and user-predictable
if the conditions specified in both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are satisfied.
Proposition 7 is also used to generate Algorithms 3 and 4. Algorithm 3 proposes
a method of construction of the hybrid user-observable subspace, while Algorithm
4 proposes a method of construction of the hybrid user-predictable subspace of the
system H. If the system H is either not user-observable, or not user-predictable, or
neither, Algorithms 3 and 4 can be used to determine where the system falls short of
user-observability and/or user-predictability. The terms N (·) and R(·) denote the
null space and range space, respectively. The symbol ⊙ represents the hybrid sum
of subspaces.
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Algorithm 3 User-Observable Subspace of Hybrid System H
Require: Observations ψ ∈ Ψ are available, and sets Qyq and Iσf are known.
Ensure: User-observable hybrid subspace OH
1: OH,q ← {q ∈ Q | Qyq ∩ Iσf ≤ 1}
2: if OH,q = ∅ then
3:

OH,q ← {q ∈ Q | rank(Pq,2 Pq,1 Oq ) = rank([Pq,2 Pq,1 Oq Pq,2 Pq,1 (Y −Γq,1 u)]) ∧
rank(Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 Oq′ ) ̸= rank([Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 Oq′ Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 (Y − Γq′ ,1 u)])}

4:

if OH,q = ∅ then
return OH,q = ∅

5:
6:

else
T
OH,x ← R(CqT ) ⊕ ATq (R(CqT ) ∩ N (Bq,λ
)⊕

7:

9:

OH ← OH,q ⊙ OH,x

◃ ⊙: hybrid sum of subspaces

end if

10: else
11:

T
OH,x ← R(CqT ) ⊕ ATq (R(CqT ) ∩ N (Bq,λ
)⊕

n−2
∑

T
R((Aiq )T CqT ) ∩ N (Bq,λ
)∩

i=1

ATq N (BqT ))
12:

T
R((Aiq )T CqT ) ∩ N (Bq,λ
)∩

i=1

ATq N (BqT ))
8:

n−2
∑

OH ← OH,q ⊙ OH,x

◃ ⊙: hybrid sum of subspaces

13: end if
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Algorithm 4 User-Predictable Subspace of Hybrid System H
Require: Observations ψ ∈ Ψ are available, and sets Qyq′ and Iσb ′ are known.
Ensure: User-predictable hybrid subspace PH
1: PH,q ← {q ∈ Q | Qyq′ ∩ Iσb ′ ≤ 1}
2: if PH,q = ∅ then
3:

PH,q ← {q ∈ Q | rank(Pq,2 Pq,1 Oq ) = rank([Pq,2 Pq,1 Oq Pq,2 Pq,1 (Y −Γq,1 u)]) ∧
rank(Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 Oq′ ) ̸= rank([Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 Oq′ Pq′ ,2 Pq′ ,1 (Y − Γq′ ,1 u)])}

4:

if PH,q = ∅ then
return PH,q = ∅

5:
6:

else

7:

T
PH,x ← EOH (N (ĀTq,12 ) ∩ N (B̄q,λO
))
H

8:

PH ← PH,q ⊙ PH,x

9:

◃ ⊙: hybrid sum of subspaces

end if

10: else
11:

T
PH,x ← EOH (N (ĀTq,12 ) ∩ N (B̄q,λO
))
H

12:

PH ← PH,q ⊙ PH,x

◃ ⊙: hybrid sum of subspaces

13: end if
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σ1

AP

Priority1
σ1

σ2

σ2

σ2
σ1

Priority2

σ2

Dual
Input

σ1

Figure 3.1: Pilot and copilot “fight” for control authority.

Now we present an aircraft example for which Algorithms 1 and 2 can be used to
analyze the system for user-observability and user-predictability.
Example: Consider an abstraction of the longitudinal dynamics of an aircraft
FMS as a linear hybrid system H = (Q, X, Σ, R, φ, fq ), where Q = {P riority 1,
P riority 2, Dual Input, AP }, the continuous state x ∈ X, the set of discrete events
Σ composed of the human-initiated events σ1 and σ2 , continuous reference inputs
R = {r1 , r2 , r− }, the state transition function φ is deterministic and defined as in
Figure 3.1, and the continuous dynamics are defined as in Section 3.1.
We define the hybrid output map as in Section 3.1 as well. The set of discrete
outputs is given by Yq = {AP, M AN }, where hq (AP ) = AP and hq (P riority 1) =
hq (P riority 2) = hq (Dual Input) = M AN .
The aircraft in AP mode signifies that autopilot is sending command signals to
the flight controls. The aircraft in P riority 1 mode, shortened to P 1 for convenience,
is representative of the first user, or pilot, having authority over the flight controls.
Similarly, P riority 2 mode, shortened to P 2, is representative of the second user,
or copilot, having authority over the flight controls. Finally, the mode Dual Input,
shortened to Dual, represents the special case in which both the pilot and copilot
take authority over the flight controls. Further explanation of this special case is
given with respect to the users’ continuous reference inputs.
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Figure 3.2: Right seat armrest showing the sidestick on an A-330 aircraft [1].

For further clarification, the event σ1 represents the pilot commanding authority
of the manual flight controls; this event occurs when the pilot presses the Priority
button on his respective sidestick controller (Fig. 3.2). The event σ2 represents
the copilot commanding authority of the manual flight controls; this event occurs
when the copilot, in turn, presses the Priority button on his respective sidestick
controller. Normal aircraft operation procedure requires that the pilot not flying
(PNF) call out, or notify, the pilot flying (PF) of his intent to take over the controls
by pushing his respective Priority button. This procedure would indicate that both
σ1 and σ2 are annunciated events. However, we consider the case, as occurs in the
Air France Flight 447 [1], in which the flight crew do not notify one another of the
intent to take the controls because they have become preoccupied with the event of
an impending stall. By assuming the perspective of the first human user, the pilot,
σ1 is annunciated but σ2 is not annunciated. Figure 3.2 supports the choice to allow
event σ2 to be unannunciated to the pilot because the copilot’s sidestick controller
movements and button presses are obscured from the pilot.
The open-loop dynamics of H are based on a linearized model of the longitudinal
aircraft dynamics for a B-747 in level flight at 40,000 feet traveling with a horizontal
speed of 774 feet per second (fps) [21], where the state vector is x = [V, α, θ̇, θ]T . V
represents deviations from the trim horizontal speed in fps, α is the angle of attack
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˙ is the pitch rate in radians per second, and θ is the pitch
(AOA) in radians, theta
angle in radians. The input is the elevator deflection δe in radians. The open-loop
matrices are the same for each mode and are defined as follows.





0.010
−0.003 0.039
0
−0.322





−0.180
−0.065 −0.319 7.74
0




ẋ = 
 δe
x + 

−1.160
 0.020 −0.101 −0.429
0




0
0
0
1
0
[
]
yx = 0 0 1 x

(3.10)

The closed-loop dynamics are determined by a reference tracking feedback control
law, where the reference inputs r ∈ R vary for each mode.
Priority 1 Mode
δe = −Kx + N r1
Priority 2 Mode
δe = −Kx + N r2
Dual Input Mode
δe = −Kx + N

( r1 + r2 )
2

AP Mode
δe = −Kx + N r−
In P 1 mode, it is assumed that the first user applies a reference input r1 , and
in P 2 mode the second user applies a reference input r2 . In Dual mode, both users
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have commanded control authority, so their reference inputs are averaged [1]. In
AP mode, the reference input is the same as the previous reference input, meaning
that the reference input remains the same as it was before the mode change into AP
mode. This behavior reflects the attempt of many automation designers to create an
autopilot that helps the human user by inferring the human’s intent.
Before we discuss the role of the reference inputs further, we analyze the discrete
modes and transitions. Let the initial system mode be Q0 = AP . By first applying
Algorithm 1 to H, it is clear that the system meets the conditions stated in lines 2
and 3 of Algorithm 1. Therefore, the initial hybrid state is both user-observable and
user-predictable.
Applying Algorithm 2 to H indicates that the system fails to meet the conditions
in line 3. For instance, the first term in line 3 states that the discrete output of
two modes, between which an unannunciated event occurs, must be different. The
system fails to meet this condition for the transitions between modes P riority 1 and
Dual Input since the event σ2 , representing the copilot’s attempt to take control
authority, is unannunciated to the pilot.
Furthermore, the system fails the second and third conditions in line 3 of Algorithm 2. Note that QM AN = {P 1, P 2, Dual}, QAP = {AP }, and Iσf1 = {P 1, P 2,
Dual, AP } = Iσb1 = Iσf2 = Iσb2 . Therefore, only the interection of set QAP and each of
the forward and backward reachable sets for each event will meet the conditions. For
instance, |QAP ∩ Iσf1 | = |{AP }| = 1 and |QAP ∩ Iσb2 | = |{AP }| = 1. But the system
fails the conditions for the intersection of set QM AN and the forward and backward
reachable sets, like |QM AN ∩ Iσf1 | = |{P 1, P 2, Dual, AP }| = 4.
Since the discrete information does not allow the pilot to uniquely reconstruct the
current mode of the system, we must continue on to line 9 of Algorithm 2 in order
to determine if the discrete mode can be distinguished via the continuous output.
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In particular, we focus on distinguishing P 1 mode from Dual mode and vice versa
because these modes share the same discrete output and are separated only by an
unannunciated event.
The continuous output and its derivatives for P 1 mode can be expressed as in
(3.11), where only the pilot’s input is present. Neither the automation nor the
copilot have an effect on the control input in P 1 mode. The continuous output and
its derivatives for Dual mode can be expressed as in (3.12), where the automation
input does not appear but the copilot can input to the system.

Y = OP 1 x + Γ P 1 N U

Y = ODual x + ΓDual

(3.11)

N
N
U + ΓDual
λ
2
2

(3.12)

In this case, the term ⊓ represents the reference input and its higher derivatives.
However, the reference inputs are constant for this example, so the higher derivatives
of the reference inputs are zero by construction. The matrices ΓP 1 and ΓDual happen
to be equal in this case. The value of ΓP 1 is given in (3.13).


ΓP 1

0

0

0

0







CB
0
0
0


=

 C(A − BK)B
CB
0 0


C(A − BK)2 B C(A − BK)B CB 0

(3.13)

Note that projection matrices are not required to eliminate the higher derivatives
of the pilot’s reference input because they are already equal to zero. No automation
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inputs are present, so projection matrices are not required to eliminate those as
unknown inputs either. Only in Dual mode does the copilot’s input appear. A
projection matrix is required to eliminate the unknown term associated with the
copilot’s input. However, eliminating the effect of λ using a projection matrix such
that P ΓDual = 0 will also eliminate the effect of U.
Eliminating the appropriate terms yields the following rank conditions to distinguish P 1 mode from Dual mode according to line 9 of Algorithm 2.

rank(OP 1 ) = rank([OP 1 (Y − ΓP 1,1 N u)]) ∧
rank(P ODual ) ̸= rank(P [ODual (Y − ΓDual,1 N2 u)])

(3.14)

To distinguish Dual mode from P 1 mode, the rank conditions become

rank(P ODual ) = rank(P [ODual (Y − ΓDual,1 N2 u)]) ∧
rank(OP 1 ) ̸= rank([OP 1 (Y − ΓP 1,1 N u)])

(3.15)

In this case, P is given by the following.


0 −1 0 0

P = 
1 0 0 0

(3.16)

However, checking the conditions reveals that these two modes cannot be distinguished from one another using the continuous output either. The second part of each
rank condition requires non-equivalence of the left-hand-side and right-hand-side of
the equation, but the system fails to satisfy this requirement.
While Algorithm 2 indicates that the modes of H cannot be distinguished via
either the discrete or continuous information, there may be aspects of this problem
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Figure 3.3: Closed-loop step responses for modes AP , P riority 1, P riority 2, and
Dual Input when the reference inputs r1 , r2 , and r− are equal.

that the algorithm does not yet capture. For instance, consider the scenario in
which the reference inputs r1 and r2 are equal. Let r1 = r2 = +6◦ (Fig. 3.3). In
this situation, the discrete mode of aircraft operation does not matter because the
reference input is the same for all of the modes, including Dual mode because the
average of the reference inputs happens to be the same as the pilot’s reference input
alone. This configuration means that the continuous output is consistent with the
pilot’s expectations regardless of the mode. Thus, the pilot can accurately predict
the continuous state of the system, a nuance that Algorithm 2 does not capture.
This result illustrates the fact that the conditions for user-observability and userpredictability presented here are sufficient, but not necessary. In other words, there
are very special cases in which a system may not need to satisfy the user-observability
and user-predictability conditions to ensure effective human-automation interaction.
However, if even a slight change in the reference inputs occurs, this effect will
be lost, and the system will once again fail to be user-predictable. When reference
inputs r1 and r2 are significantly different, the negative effect on user-predictability is
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Figure 3.4: Closed-loop step responses for modes AP , P riority 1, P riority 2, and
Dual Input when the reference inputs r1 and r2 are not equal.

even more prevalent. Take the example in which r1 = +6◦ and r2 = −6◦ so that the
pilot is commanding the aircraft to ascend and the copilot is commanding the aircraft
to descend (Fig. 3.4). Also let the reference input in AP mode be equal to the pilot’s
last input so that r− = r1 . Despite the fact that the reference inputs for AP mode
and P 1 mode are identical, the event σ1 is annunciated to the pilot, so these modes
are distinguishable. Furthermore, the pilot is be able to distinguish between modes
AP and P 2 due to the discrete output, but modes P 1 and Dual are indistinguishable
via the discrete information. It also follows that the continuous output in Dual mode
is not only inconsistent with the pilot’s input, but also inconsistent with the copilot’s
input, as neither the ascent command nor the descent command is executed. This
system behavior leads to a kind of mode mismatch in which it is not only possible
for the user to confuse two modes (mode confusion) but it also possible for the user
to confuse any and all modes of the system at once.
A proposed solution to this problem of mode mismatch is to alter the discrete
outputs so that Dual mode is explicitly indicated in the flight mode annunciator,
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Figure 3.5: Hybrid system model of the aircraft FMS in the events leading up to the
crash of Air France Flight 447.

or elsewhere in the flight displays. Then the discrete output for Dual mode could
resemble the following: hq (Dual) = Double Input.
The simple system shown in Figure 3.1, which characterizes a common scenario
in flight, has been shown to be neither user-observable nor user-predictable in certain off-nominal flight conditions. The user of such a system would be unable to
uniquely reconstruct the current state of the system or predict the next state of the
system. This result suggests that the more complex aircraft systems also exhibit
poor observability.

3.3

Example: Pilot Display

We consider the 2009 Air France Flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, in which
a number of HAI problems took place and eventually led to an unrecoverable stall
situation.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Discrete Outputs
Output (yq )
AP
AP + F D
A/T HR
A/T HR + F D
FD
M AN

3.3.1

Modes with Output yq
ALT HLD, OOT ALT HLD
ALT HLD + F D, OOT ALT HLD + F D
ALT M AN , CON 2 ALT , OOT ALT M AN
ALT M AN + F D, CON 2 ALT + F D,
OOT ALT M AN + F D
M AN + F D, CON 2 M AN + F D, OOT + F D
M AN , CON 2 M AN , OOT

Model Description

We abstract the longitudinal dynamics of the FMS to construct a linear hybrid
system H = (Q, X, Σ, R, φ, fq ), with discrete modes Q = {ALT HLD, ALT HLD +
F D, OOT ALT HLD, OOT ALT HLD + F D, ALT M AN, ALT M AN + F D,
OOT ALT M AN, OOT ALT M AN + F D, M AN, M AN + F D, OOT, OOT + F D,
CON 2 ALT, CON 2 ALT + F D, CON 2 M AN, CON 2 M AN + F D}, initial state
Q0 = {ALT HLD + F D}, continuous state x ∈ X, the set of events Σ composed of
the human initiated events σAP , σthr , and σF D as well as the automatic transitions
γ1 , γ2 , and γ3 , continuous reference inputs r ∈ R, discrete transition function φ is
defined in Figure 3.5, and the continuous dynamics are defined as in Section 3.1.
We define the hybrid output map h : Q × X → Yq × Yx = Ψ, where the output Ψ
is composed of both discrete and continuous elements as is shown using the notation
Ψ = (hq (q), hx (q, x)) = (yq , yx ). The set of discrete outputs is given by Yq = {AP,
AP + F D, A/T HR, A/T HR + F D, F D, M AN }, and hq is summarized in Table
3.1. These discrete outputs are modeled from the indications visible in the pilot’s
flight mode annunciator (FMA), information for which was taken from [17] and [1].
The indicators appearing in the FMA for each mode are shown in Figure 3.6.
The discrete event σF D represents the pilot pushing the flight director (FD) but-
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Table 3.2: Summary of Automatic Transitions
Event Variables Affected
Condition
γ1
Speed (V )
Vavg (t) − Vavg (t − 1) ≤ −30 kts
γ2
Angle of Attack (α)
α ≥ αprot
γ3
Angle of Attack (α)
α < αprot

Annunciated Event?
No
Yes
Yes

ton on the flight control unit (FCU) panel (Fig. 3.7). The discrete event σthr represents the pilot pushing the autothrust button on the FCU panel. Also, a summary
of the automatic transitions is given in Table 3.2.
The open-loop dynamics of H are based on a linearized model of the longitudinal
aircraft dynamics for a B-747 in level flight at 40,000 ft and 774 fps [4]. The state
vector is x = [V, α, θ̇, θ]T such that V is the deviation from the trim horizontal aircraft
speed in fps, α is the AOA in radians, θ̇ is the pitch rate in rad/s, and θ is the pitch
angle in radians. The actuator inputs δe and δt correspond to the elevator deflection
and thrust, respectively.





−0.003 0.039
0
−0.322
0.010
1



 
−0.065 −0.319 7.74



0 

−0.180 −0.040 δe 
ẋ = 
(3.17)
x + 

 0.020 −0.101 −0.429

−1.160 0.598  δt
0




0
0
1
0
0
0

Since the authority over control surfaces varies among modes, Table 3.3 summarizes the modes for which the human or automation or both has control authority.
The continuous output yx consists of the horizontal speed, pitch angle, and flight
path angle, which are readily available in the displays for an A-330 aircraft [17].
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Table 3.3: Control Authority in Various Modes of Flight 447
Modes
ALT HLD
ALT HLD + F D
OOT ALT HLD
OOT ALT HLD + F D
OOT ALT M AN
OOT ALT M AN + F D
ALT M AN
ALT M AN + F D
CON 2 ALT
CON 2 ALT + F D
OOT
OOT + F D
M AN
M AN + F D
CON 2 M AN
CON 2 M AN + F D

Goal
γ→0

Automation Control Human Control
δe , δt
—

θ → −3

δe , δt

—

θ → −3

δe , δt

—

γ→0

δt

δe

V → 10

δt

δe

θ → −3

δe

δt

γ→0

—

δe , δt

V → 10

—

δe , δ t



1 0 0 0




yx = 0 0 0 1 x


0 −1 0 1

(3.18)

The closed-loop dynamics result from a reference tracking feedback control law
(3.19), where only two outputs are available for tracking at a time. The two outputs
available for tracking in each mode are assumed to be the horizontal speed V and the
output associated with the goal for each mode. The goal for each mode, indicated
by the reference input r ∈ R, is defined in Table 3.3.
 
δ
 e  = −Kq x + Nq r
δt

(3.19)
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Figure 3.6: Indicators on the the automated systems status section of the flight mode
annunciator (FMA), part of the primary flight display (PFD) for flight crew [1]. The
six possible indicator combinations shown correspond to the discrete outputs for
modes of hybrid system H.

3.3.2

Accident Description

This accident scenario begins with the aircraft in level flight, which can be achieved
in a number of different ways according to the FMS mode. However, the accident
investigation report indicates that the aircraft was in ALT HLD + F D mode at
the beginning of the accident scenario [1]. ALT HLD and ALT HLD + F D modes
maintain or hold an altitude set by the user. In this case, the aircraft was maintaining an altitude of 35,000 ft. About two hours into the flight, at least two of the the
three Pitot probes, located on the front nose of the aircraft, became obstructed by
ice, generating erroneous airspeed measurements. Because these airspeed measurements deviated significantly from one another and the third airspeed measurement,
the pilot’s flight management guidance and envelope computer (FMGEC) could not
function [1]. This caused the autopilot and autothrust to disconnect automatically,
sending the aircraft into the mode CON 2 ALT + F D via the automatic transition
γ1 . Since γ1 is not annunicated, the flight crew were unaware that they had entered
mode CON 2 ALT + F D.
Furthermore, the A-330 has fly-by-wire flight controls, meaning that the pilot’s
movement of the sidestick controller is converted into an electrical signal that is sent
to the flight control primary computer (FCPC) [1]. This computer calculates the
appropriate command to send to the actuators, such as the elevators, based on the
pilot’s orders. The mathematical relationship used to convert the pilot’s orders into
actuator commands is called a control law [1]. Under normal aircraft operation,
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Figure 3.7: Flight control unit (FCU) panel in the aircraft cockpit [1].

meaning that all system components are working properly and sensor readings are
consistent, the “normal” control law is employed in the A-330 [1]. But when certain
system components are malfunctioning or key sensor readings are inconsistent, the
aircraft may adopt an “alternate” control law, in which some automated systems are
disabled and control of some actuators is done directly, meaning that the actuators
will move in direct proportion to the pilot’s orders. This direct control contrasts
the normal operation of the aircraft in which the control surfaces move according to
some transformation of the pilot’s orders.
During Flight 447, the high variation in the speed readings affected the flight control primary computers (FCPC), which caused a control law reconfiguration to “alternate 2” law. This control law reconfiguration corresponds to mode CON 2 ALT +F D
and caused the autothrust to become locked in the previous position until disabled
manually by the crew and triggered a loss of high pitch and high angle of attack
(AOA) protection. Loss of such safe flight envelope protection means that the aircraft will respond to pilot orders even if those orders cause the aircraft to assume an
unsafe attitude, whereas “normal” law prevents actuators from responding to pilot
orders that could cause the aircraft to exceed safe limits of operation. The modes for
which the automation takes control of the elevator due to an unsafe aircraft attitude
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Figure 3.8: Left: Flight director “V” indicator for flight path angle. Right: Flight
director crossbars on the primary flight display [28].

corresponds to modes OOT ALT HLD, OOT ALT HLD + F D, OOT ALT M AN ,
OOT ALT M AN + F D, OOT , and OOT + F D, where “OOT” stands for outof-trim. and subsequent loss of flight envelope protections also correspond to the
ALT 2 T HR + F D mode.
Despite the erroneous speed readings and malfunctioning flight computers, the
pilot’s FD was still engaged in the mode CON 2 ALT + F D. The FD is a computerized function in which the appropriate pitch and roll guides for a given maneuver
are integrated into crossbar indicators, or a flight path angle guide is integrated into
a “V” indicator, on the primary flight display (PFD) (see Figure 3.8). The FD
is intended to help the pilot complete maneuvers smoothly and efficiently [1], [17].
However, the FCPC computes the correct position of the FD, so the FD was calculating orders based on erroneous data. The FD also became unavailable for short
periods of time during the incident when all three speed measurements were invalid,
but the flight crew still never turned it off [1].
The pilot did, however, disengage the autothrust, thereby discontinuing the thrust
lock function, which corresponds to the mode CON 2 M AN + F D. The aircraft remained in this mode until the end of the incident without the flight crew’s acknowledgment of an unsafe attitude. Due to the control law reconfiguration, transition
into an out-of-trim mode, in which the automation would take over control of the
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elevator if the crew drove the aircraft too near the boundaries of the flight envelope,
was impossible. Therefore, the crew caused the aircraft to stall while still under the
impression that they were operating the aircraft safely.

3.3.3

Interface Analysis

These issues with mode confusion suggest that the FMS is not user-observable and
user-predictable. We apply Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 to determine if, in fact,
the system failed the user-observability and user-predictability requirements. First,
we examine the initial mode ALT HLD + F D. ALT HLD + F D fails to meet the
second condition in line 2 of Algorithm 1 for |QAP +F D ∩IσbAP | = |QAP +F D ∩IσbF D | = 2.
Progressing through Algorithm 1 to line 8 also reveals that the condition stated is
not met for initial state ALT HLD+F D. However, the condition in line 9 is satisfied
because the observability matrix associated with mode ALT HLT + F D is full rank,
which indicates that the continuous initial state can be determined if the initial mode
is known.
Further analyzing the system using Algorithm 2 yields the following: the system fails the first condition in line 3 because the discrete output is the same for
some modes separated by an unannunciated event, such as h(ALT M AN + F D) =
h(CON 2 ALT + F D) for unannunciated event γ1 . The system also fails the other
conditions stated in line 3 of Algorithm 2. For example, |QA/T HR ∩IσfF D | = |QA/T HR ∩
IσbF D | = |QA/T HR | = 3 since IσfF D = IσbF D = Q. Thus, neither the current nor the
next discrete mode can be determined from the discrete information alone. Applying line 9 of the algorithm to the system reveals that the discrete mode cannot be
distinguished from the continuous output either.
For instance, the modes ALT M AN + F D and CON 2 ALT + F D cannot
be distinguished from one another via discrete information, but the continuous
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output does not provide enough information to distinguish between them either.
The continuous output and higher derivatives for mode ALT M AN + F D, where
q = ALT M AN + F D is given by

Y = Oq x + Γe Nq,e U + Γt Nq,t λ

(3.20)

where λ represents the thrust reference input, which is controlled by the automation
in this mode. Thus, λ is considered to be the unknown automation input. To
eliminate this term, only one projection matrix is required. The continuous output
and higher derivatives for mode CON 2 ALT + F D has the same structure as that
shown in (3.20), where q = CON 2 ALT + F D, since the automation also controls
the thrust in CON 2 ALT + F D.
To distinguish mode ALT M AN + F D from mode CON 2 ALT + F D, let q =
ALT M AN + F D and q ′ = CON 2 ALT + F D. The rank condition of Proposition
7 becomes to the following

rank(P Oq ) = rank([P Oq P (Y − Γe Nq,e U)]) ∧
rank(P Oq′ ) ̸= rank([P Oq′ P (Y − Γe Nq′ ,e U)])

for the projection matrix
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However, the second part of condition (3.21) is not satisfied for this case, or when
attempting to distinguish mode ALT M AN + F D from OOT ALT M AN + F D
using the continuous output.
This result occurs for many combinations of current mode q and next possible
mode q ′ for the system H. The results suggests that the discrete mode is nearly
impossible to decipher via the continuous output for systems with many similar
parameters and constant reference inputs.
Furthermore, Algorithms 1 and 2 may not capture the most interesting system
phenomena. For instance, the most distinguishing characteristic of a given mode
may be the higher derivatives of the input. Since the algorithms restrict the available
information to that of the zeroth derivative of the input, they do not capture the
most dynamic system behavior, which may aid in mode distinguishability.
Finally, a possible solution to the lack of information available to the human
user for state reconstruction would be to include the automation input in the pilot
display.
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Methods for mode distinguishability via the continuous output were presented for
linear hybrid systems with partially unknown input. Sufficient conditions for userobservability and user-predictability of linear hybrid systems with partially unknown
input were also given, as well as algorithms detailing the procedure to check for userobservability and user-predictability of linear hybrid systems. These algorithms were
then applied to two aircraft examples: one in which the interaction between the pilot,
copilot, and the automation affected observability from the pilot’s perspective, and
another abstracted from Air France Flight 447.
The first of these examples demonstrated that the user-observability and userpredictability conditions are sufficient, but not necessary. In other words, very special
cases may exist in which a system does not need to satisfy the user-observability and
user-predictability conditions to ensure proper human-automation interaction, but
such cases may never occur in reality due to the presence of disturbances, which is
not considered here since only deterministic systems are studied. The final example
illustrated that the system’s continuous input may provide the information required
to distinguish modes via the continuous output, but by eliminating unknown input
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terms, that information becomes unavailable for mode distinguishability. A solution to this lack of information contained in the output would be to include the
automation input in the pilot display so that such information could be used for
state reconstruction. Future work includes investigation of which system subsets are
user-observable and user-predictable even though the entire system may not be.
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